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ABSTRACT
Social spending is a large and controversial program within the United States. Though a
number of studies examined its effects on Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) between countries,
very few specifically looked at its effectiveness solely within the United States. By doing so,
international political policy deviations are controlled for. Further, most studies neglect the
externalities of social spending on living standards. This paper fills these gaps by utilizing two US
Census aid data sets – state & local spending and federal aid & transfer payments – for all 50
states to study the effects of social spending on Gross Domestic Product, Income, and Personal
Consumption Expenditures
Using two-stage residual inclusion estimation, the analysis first predicts social spending
variables using its lags and Gross Domestic Product, Income, or Personal Consumption. In the
second stage, the first-stage residuals predict Gross Domestic Product, Income, or Personal
Consumption. Using this method, the short-term positive marginal benefits were found for
Housing (≈$12 on GDP and income), Incapacity (≈$3 on income), Workers’ Compensation (≈$31
on GDP and income) and Other (≈$1.75 on income and personal consumption) spending.
Negative effects were found to varying degrees on GDP, income and personal consumption for
Family, Health, Labor, Unemployment and Old Age spending. Most variables were consistent
between the two datasets and with prior studies. However, differences in the direction from
prior studies of the effect on Gross Domestic Product arose for Health, Old Age and
Unemployment.

ix

Additionally, this paper looks into the interplay of politics with social spending. In
particular, how particular years, the political party and gubernatorial turnover are related to
social spending and its effects on both the economy and standards of living. Both Labor and
Welfare spending show strong influences from political policies.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Since Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced the New Deal in 1933, social spending, in one
form or another, has been a significant government program in the United States, and yet,
despite its longevity, the expenditure of public funds has remained a topic of constant debate.
On one side, some argue that the United States is unfairly providing too many handouts at the
expense of hardworking individuals, other government programs, businesses, and the rich.
Simultaneously, others claim that social spending maintains a minimum standard of living and
subsistence, increases buying power, and reduces crime. These positions stem from one’s
political attitudes, demographic background, and religious inclinations, in addition to the varying
degrees of generosity, inclusiveness, and attitudes toward redistribution fostered by the same
(Huber, Mustillo& Stephens, 2008). For liberals and conservatives, the resounding constant
question is not just one of how to spend the money, but whether the government receives a
positive return on its investment beyond the noble self-satisfaction and venerable social flattery
provided to the politicians and their constituents. This paper seeks to place a tangible monetary
value on social spending for a better society, particularly within the United States.
With one side saying yes to social spending and another side saying no, it is first
important to establish how to measure a positive return. The stereotypical conservative will
tend to focus on the economic return, while the liberal focuses on social returns. This paper will
look at both by examining short-term effects of social spending on three different variables.
These are Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”), income, and personal consumption. (The collection
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of these dependent variables will here in be referred to as the “Macro Dependent Variables”
[Table 1].) GDP focuses on the total economic performance gains as a result of social spending,
while income and consumption highlight the economic gains in human well-being as a result of
social spending programs. The theoretical economic impact of social spending on GDP should
feature increases in demand via public consumption by investing in low-income individuals,
increases in output through employment and increases in human capital through health
funding. Potential decreases on output exist through retirement induced labor reductions and
invalidity benefits (Furceri & Zdzienicka, 2012). In addition to the direct economic benefits of
GDP, analysis of income and personal consumption expenditures (“PCE”) give insight into the
living standards of individuals through their spending habits. Together, these variables should
provide a well-rounded view into the national externalities of social spending.
Prior research into the effects of social spending has traditionally focused on GDP, with
little attention paid to changes in standards of living. Additionally, these studies have
overwhelmingly been conducted at an international level. In particular, a disproportionate
amount of research has centered on countries within the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), although one study did feature countries within Latin
America while another focused solely within Canada. Surprisingly, only one study, Horváth et al.
(2014), specifically examined states’ GDP within the United States. Further, the analysis of social
spending on consumption, providing insight into living standards, is unprecedented, as annual
statewide consumption data from 1997 to 2012 was released for the first time in August 2014.
The broad range of social and economic variability from international analysis may provide a
greater range of data, but it simultaneously obscures finer details. By exclusively contemplating
social policies within the United States, this paper will help politicians interpret the impact of
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internal social programs’ costs through the lens of our own unique social and economic
construct.
Traditionally, papers have highlighted nine areas of social spending, not due to any
particular insight, but due to the manner of OECP data collection. State census data, available
via two different sets, is not provided in the same format. The first set, a combination of state
and local data(“State and Local Data”), compiled in Table 2, focuses on broad areas of spending
and state contributions, while the second set (“Federal Data”), compiled in Table 3,emphasizes
particular federal aid programs which redistribute money to states through various government
programs and transfer payments to individuals. The Federal Data combines government
spending into eight (as opposed to nine) categories which directly mirror the OECD studies. The
two datasets, though overlapping, offer slightly different insights; for example, the State and
Local Data includes education, which Federal Data excludes. To prevent endogeneity, an
instrumental variable (“IV”) approach, building on the work of Furceri and Zdzienicka(2012),
uses residuals of each variable of interest as the IV for regression.
The results showed positive short-term economic impacts on the GDP, income, and PCE
from Housing, Incapacity, Workers’ Compensation and Other. Housing and Workers’
Compensation showed the largest and most significant effect. Family, Health, Labor,
Unemployment, and Old Age all showed negative effects1. Labor spending had the largest shortterm negative effect. The only variable to show both positive and negative effects on the range
of dependent variables was Education spending.
The remainder of this paper explores past and present methods, impacts and
observations of social spending. Section II gives a detailed literature review on prior work done

1

All variables are capitalized throughout the paper. For clarity of combined insight, variables from both
data sets of similar composition use the same name. When necessary, this paper will specify the data set
with which a particular variable is associated.
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by authors on related topics. Section III goes over data relevance and sources. Section IV
reviews the methodology used, while Section V presents the empirical analysis and raw results.
Section VI expands on the findings by spending category and offers additional insights. Finally,
Section VII concludes with impacts and the way ahead.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Past literature on social spending has focused primarily on returns in GDP to determine
its effects, with the majority of the literature indicating some form of positive returns to GDP
(Furceri & Zdzienicka, 2012; Gupta, Clements & Tiongson, 1998; Huber, Mustillo & Stephens,
2008; Clemente, Marcuello & Montañes, 2012; Wang, 2005; and Stenberg et al., 2014). Other
authors have cited specific areas of the economy in which social spending increases economic
returns. These areas include increases in private output (Fatas & Mihov 2001), stabilization of
the economy (Furceri, 2010), and an increase in economic risk taking (Bird, 2000). Many studies
have shown that investments in social spending create a positive economic return in GDP, but
vary in degree. The expansionary effects of social spending on the economy has been noted by
Fatas & Mihov (2001) as being greater than one and by Furceri & Zdzienicka (2012) at about 0.6.
However, Lindert (1996, 2004) states that variations in social spending across nations has not
led to slower growth or lower incomes among nations spending 10-33% of GDP on welfare
programs. But what is the best course of action? When it comes to social spending, how much
and where should we be investing?
It is important to look at not just the agglomerated dollar amount of social spending, but
also its individual components (Wang, 2005). Typical categorization of welfare programs in
OECD studies have been old age, survivors, incapacity, health, family, active labor market,
unemployment, housing and other (Furceri 2010 and Furceri & Zdzienicka, 2012). Prior
literature has found that those programs in which social spending has had the most positive
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influence on GDP have been old age, health and unemployment, though survivors and education
have been mentioned as well (Fatas & Mihov, 2001; Furceri, 2010; Furceri & Zdzienicka, 2012;
Huber et al., 2008; Wang, 2005). The preferred method of implementing these variables into
regressions has been as a percentage of GDP, and is sometimes called welfare effort (OlaskoagaLarrauri, Aláez-Aller, & Díaz-De-Basurto, 2009).
The most common indicator of successful welfare programs has been GDP; it is simple
and easily understood. Yet, despite GDP’s obvious benefits, it may not be the best or only
indicator of successful government social spending. GDP ignores wealth variation, income
flows, household produced services, destruction of the environment, and determinants of well
being (Fleurbaey, 2009). In other research, Huber et al. incorporated GDP per capita as an
independent variable for social spending; indicating social spending varies with economic
outcomes and therefore requires other indicators of success. Fleurbaey (2009), Escosura (2010)
and Gupta et al. (1998) focus on effects of human development. Specifically, Fleurbaey states
that human development, or rather “knowledge and…access to resources needed for a decent
standard of living,” is a better indicator of success for developing countries as it can lead to
future economic gains. However, the American Human Development Report, which captures
state data, is biennial and only goes back to 2009; making it a poor indicator of human well
being for this study. Instead, household income and PCE are used as they more closely mirror
material living standards than GDP (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009). Both GDP and human
welfare, which can lead to future economic gains, are examined as indicators of social spending
success.
The majority of work on social spending and its relationship to GDP has focused on
country level data, particularly within the OECD countries. Though some authors have focused
on other country groups like the Gulf Cooperation Council of countries (Al-Faris, 2002) and Latin
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America (Huber et al., 2008), these studies are few. Data within countries is even harder to find.
Wang (2005) is one of the few authors who explores domestic data, examining empirical
evidence in health and education from Canada. Only one study specifically compared state level
data across the United States, Horváth et al. (2014), which analyzed GDP effects across
departments. There, they found that spending by the Department of Health and Human
Services and the Department of Labor have negative effects, while outlays by the Department of
Commerce and the Department of Interior have positive effects. Unlike these papers that solely
examine state social spending effects on GDP, this paper also captures the impacts on human
development through analysis of income and personal consumption expenditures.
When comparing countries, there are numerous differences at play affecting the
outcomes of social policies on GDP. These differences both aid and hinder analysis. Bird (2000)
notes that “sufficient variation in Welfare State measures…requires a dataset that crosses major
jurisdictional boundaries” (pp. 358). However, by focusing within a country, we can examine a
finer level of regional politics and philosophies at play in social spending outcomes that meet
national expectations with regional implementation. Huber et al. (2008) notes when analyzing
data for Latin America that modifications have to be made from the typical OECD country
analysis. The same is true in analyzing state data due to local level politics, economies, culture,
and more significantly, available data.
Implementation will follow in the footsteps of Clement et al. (2012) and Furceri &
Zdzienicka (2012). These analyses focus on a range of social variables while examining not only
the effects in GDP, including its multiplier effect, but also effects on investment and the private
sector. They include different income levels, income elasticity, unit roots for time series
properties and account for possible reverse causation of GDP to deliver a robust analysis.
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Likewise, we cannot neglect that an increase in GDP leads to more money available for
expanding the role of government and increasing social spending (Al-Faris, 2002). It is also
sensitive to the “ups and downs of economic growth” (Clement et al., 2012). An increase in GDP
will potentially lead to reverse causation. Furceri & Zdzienicka (2012) address this by identifying
government-spending shocks and estimating a policy rule for social spending, while many other
authors seem to ignore the possible effects of endogeneity.
Overall, this paper seeks to add value to the existing literature by finding the social
policies that are best in advancing the general welfare of the United States, not countries in
general, through their short-term impacts on GDP, income and PCE. Additionally, it provides
insight on, not just economic, but political influences of social policies. The results hope to
guide future non-partisan decisions on social policy.
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CHAPTER III
DATA
State GDP data comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (“BEA”) and is given in
both total and per capita terms. Though the data goes back to 1987, there is a discontinuity in
the data in 1997 when data collection changed from the Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC”)
to the North American Industry Classification System (“NAICS”). NAICS, the newer data set, is
more consistent with US GDP definitions2. Further, state PCE data is only available from 19972012. Due to GDP data standardization differences and PCE data availability, analysis is
restricted from 1997 onward. GDP, based on NAICS data, is given in 2009 dollars and all other
data is converted to 2009 dollars to match.
Social spending data is taken from three US Census Bureau sources. State and Local
Data comes from the State and Local Government Finances of the Census of Governments,
sorted by state, which provides information on the structure, function, finances, and
employment of over 90,000 state and local governments. The applicable social spending data,
in the expenditure section, divides the data into general areas, those of interest include:
Education, Employee Retirement, Health, housing & community development (“Housing”),
Social Insurance, Unemployment, veteran services (“Veteran”), Welfare, Workers’
Compensation and other insurance trusts (“Other”)3. A concern with government finance data

2

The BEA states “there are differences in source data and different estimation methodologies. This data
discontinuity may affect both the levels and the growth rates of GDP by state. Users of GDP by state are
strongly cautioned against appending the two data series in an attempt to construct a single time series
for 1963 to 2014. For more information visit http://www.bea.gov/regional/docs/product/.
3
For a full list of applicable welfare variables from State and Local Government Finances see Table 2.
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is that many state governments have different fiscal years, not only from federal fiscal years, but
also from each other. The use of lagged data minimizes these differences.
The data described above does not provide insight on how federal aid was allocated to
the federal programs within the state. Section 8 (of the annual Statistical Abstracts produced by
the US Census Bureau) includes a table for Federal Aid to State and Local Governments by State
for the most recent years, which shows how federal aid was allocated among states for specific
programs such as Women, Infants, and Children; Head Start; No Child Left Behind; Medicare &
Medicaid; and others4. This data, in conjunction with the US Census Bureau’s Government
Transfer Payments to Individuals by State data from Section 11 of the annual Statistical
Abstracts, are the sources for Federal Data. Government transfer payments include information
on retirement & disability insurance, medical payments, income maintenance benefits,
unemployment benefits, veteran’s benefits, federal education & training assistance, and other.
To mirror the OECD spending variables in other studies, these two federal datasets are
combined by examining the OECD database5; specifically the composition of variables that make
up United States social spending. For each category of social spending, matching variables from
the Federal Aid and Transfer Payment dataset and the Transfer Payments to Individuals dataset
were applied (Table 3).
Data comprising State and Local Data as well as Federal Data are not mixed when
regressing due to high levels of multicollinearity that exist between them. This is because much
of the data represents opposite ends, allocation and distribution, of the same programs. As
such, separate regression analyses for each dataset were performed.

4

For a complete list of the welfare programs from the table Federal Aid to State and Local Governments
by State, which is included in Section 8 of the US Census Bureau Statistical Abstract, see Table 3
5
The OECD Social Expenditure Detailed Data Set can be found at
http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_DET&lang=en
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Prior studies have generally divided social spending into nine categories because of how
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) formatted their statistics.
These included old age, survivors, incapacity related, health, family, active labor market
program, unemployment benefits, housing, and other policy areas (Furceri & Zdzienicka, 2012).
While the US Census does not summarize its data in this manner, the combination of its
categories can be distributed, for Federal Data, such that it encompasses the same OECD
categories, with the exception of the survivor category.
In addition to GDP as a dependent variable, which may have endogeneity with social
spending, personal consumption expenditure and income growth are used. These provide a
second, and arguably better (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009), reference of human well-being than
GDP. Furceri & Zdzienicka (2012) found that social spending had positive effects on
consumption using OECD country level data. They also noted that the welfare component of
expenditure, in relation to economic activity, is largely ignored in the literature. The BEA
released data on Personal Consumption Expenditures by State for the first time on August 7,
2014 as prototype estimates and covers the years 1997 to 2012 (in nominal dollars). The BEA
also provides data on state income through quarterly news releases compiled via online
interactive tables.
An introductory analysis of the data is provided in Figures 1, 2 and 3, which compare
State and Local Data from the State and Local Government Finances to state GDP. From these
graphs we can see an obvious correlation between GDP and social spending. The first graph,
Figure 1, shows states with higher social spending, the left side of the graph, also have
comparatively higher GDPs. Likewise, in Figure 2, we plot each state’s social spending and GDP
by year. An OLS regression on this data has a highly significant (0.1%) and very positive upward
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trend coefficient of 4.66 indicating that for each dollar spent on welfare, GDP increases by
$4.66. The R2 is 0.3642.
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Regressing with the differences (Figure 3), using the second lag of all social spending
from State and Local Data, finds an increase of $0.85 per change in dollar spent, a significance of
12

less than 0.1, and and R2 of 0.0445. Though these graphs do not prove causation, the correlation
is apparent and warrants the study of this paper.
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Figure 3. Two Lags of Difference in State and Local Government Finances vs GDP, 1997─2012
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As discussed earlier, final data analysis on the Macro Dependent Variables, in per capita
terms, is executed in two main groups: State and Local Data and Federal Data. State and Local
Data spending utilizes State and Local Government Finances variables with no modification. This
includes Education, Employee Retirement, Health, Housing & Community Development, Social
Insurance, Unemployment, Veteran Services, Welfare, and Workers’ Compensation (Table 2).
The Federal spending analysis combines both the Federal Aid to States and Federal Transfer
Payments to Individuals into variables that mirror the international OECD analyses. These
include: Family, Health, Housing, Incapacity, Labor, Old Age, Unemployment, and Other (Table
3). By executing the analysis in groups, we avoid the endogenity issues outlined earlier.
Control variables (Table 4) focus on both the population and the economy. These
include population growth, distribution, unemployment, educational attainment, and income
shares. In addition, variables for gubernatorial party in power, governor turnover and voting
years are used for model predictions. These variables account for political maneuvering that

13

often leads to changes in social policies, thus allowing the focus to remain on actual dollars
spent.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
The empirical methodology employed follows and builds on standards set by previous
authors (Clemente et al, 2012; Lindert, 1996; Wang, 2005). The equations below are based
primarily on the OECD country-level social spending to GDP analysis used by Furceri &
Zdzienicka (2012); who themselves reference Romer & Romer (1989) to estimate the impacts of
public spending on output. This equation set was chosen for its proven use in prior literature
and its ability to isolate effects of the dependent variable, whereby social spending is treated as
a shock to the Macro Dependent Variable. Succinctly, the following equations use the lags of
the change in social spending variable and the change in the per capita Macro Dependent
Variables to predict the change in each social spending variable. Finally, to predict changes in
the Macro Dependent Variables, the residuals of the change in the social spending variables are
used. In doing so, the possibility of reverse-causation from the Macro Dependent Variables on
the variable of interest, social spending, is controlled for.
The basic model, equation (1), is based on a simple dynamic growth model with social
spending as the independent variable of interest. The inclusion of lags of the dependent
variable corrects for autocorrelation, while differencing the equation addresses omitted variable
bias and removes time invariant factors. This is modeled below:

(1)

∆

=

+

∆

,

+

∆

15

,

+ ʹ

+

The parameter of interest, , reflects the impact of a vector of social spending, s, on GDP per
Capita (“GDPpC”), y. In addition, b are time-fixed effects, β corrects for autocorrelation, X
contains a vector of control variables which can affect short term growth, and is the error
term. Prior to finding the difference equation (1), fixed effects were split between state and
time to account for consistent output by state that is non-time dependent (state-fixed effect)
and changes in national policy that vary each year, but are constant for each state (time-fixed
effect) . State-fixed effects cancel out with the difference equation, but since time-fixed effects
are time-variant, they remain in the equation6. The X vector contains data such as political
party, growth of the surrounding states, and population growth.
The primary problem with equation (1) is the potential for endogeneity between GDP
and social spending as either more money becomes available or as policy makers attempt to
stabilize the economy. This is primarily due to the flow of reverse causation, which given by
equation (2). Estimations of fiscal reaction functions by Darby and Melitz (2008) found social
spending to be counter-cyclical to GDP. This indicates that
spending and growth, this implies

< 0. With opposite signs for social

is biased downward (Furceri & Zdzienicka, 2012), which

could result in zero or negative results in OLS estimations for social spending on GDP even if the
actual effect is positive.

(2)

∆

=

∆

+

Furceri & Zdzienicka (2012) parallel other growth studies by developing a fiscal reaction
function, equation (3). Here we will estimate social spending for each state instead of by
country.

6

Specifically, in the difference equation, bt represents the change in the time-fixed effect.
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(3)
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+

∆

+

∆

+ ∅ʹ

+

In this policy equation, we have a time trend and a vector Z, which controls for various state and
population attributes, including the initial state debt to GDP ratio, initial ratio of social spending
to GDP, income distributions (using the Gini or Theil Indexes), gubernatorial turnover,
significance of voting years, and age & race distributions. The lagged values of social spending
account for the normal dynamics of the series (Romer and Romer, 1989) and include both linear
and exponential effects to allow for initial short term increases and then decreases as its
spending fluctuates. An evaluation of each regression of social spending using the BreuschPagan Lagrange multiplier, to test for state random effects, and the Hausman test, to compare
state fixed and random effects, was performed. In all cases, the pooled OLS, with year fixed
effects, was the best regression.
Time fixed-effects, in both equation (1) and (3) address national changes in the economy
for the given year. Its inclusion addresses national business cycles as well as changes to federal
law, policy, trade, and other factors influencing the economics of all 50 states.
To correct for reverse causation, there are two possible methods. The first is to use a
two stage IV approach. In this method, Lindert (1996) suggests using non-GDP related
determinants of social spending, including income effects, electoral variables, and age
distribution. These IVs attempt to capture the type of person that idealizes a need for social
spending within their communities. Despite Lindert’s conclusions, many of the variables in this
paper’s data had effects on GDP in the short term.
The second method is a form of two-stage residual inclusion estimation introduced by
Furceri & Zdzienicka (2012). The residuals from the OLS regression represent the portion of
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social spending not effected by GDP. By replacing the independent variable for social spending,
s, from equation (1) with the residuals, , of equation (3), the short-term impact of social
spending on GDP can be estimated with one direction of causation. The residuals act as a
pseudo instrumental variable, having been predicted from GDP, but not related to GDP. When
tested for possible correlation with the other independent variables, X, the residuals showed a
correlation of under 0.1 for the strong majority of the variables and their lags; the most
common variables to show a correlation greater than 0.1, though still rarely exceeding 0.2,
included the population of black individuals, the Gini coefficient, and Voting Year. The
parameter of interest remains .

(4)

∆

=

+

∆

+

,

,

+ ʹ

+

Though GDPpC is a known and reliable indicator of economic performance, as we noted earlier,
it is not the best indication of human well-being. To acquire a fuller picture of the effects of
social spending on our society, we model Equation (5) for Income per Capita (“IpC”) and
Equation (6) for PCE per Capita (“PCEpC”) after Equation (4).
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The control variables, both the X and Z vectors, come from the same pool of control
variables. The control variables, Z, utilized in predicting each social spending variable are
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repeated, though only if significant, in the X vector of the equations (4), (5), and (6) for the
Macro Dependent Variables. New ones are then added to better predict growth. By doing so,
we factor out the potential correlation between the controls and the social spending variables
of interest in the final regressions on the Macro Dependent Variables.

19

CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Results are presented in two sections. Section V.1 includes results from State and Local
Data’s government finances and Section V.2 is the results from Federal Data (the combination of
Federal Aid and Individual Transfer Payments) finances.
V.1. State and Local Government Finances
The government finance areas, from State and Local Data, of Education, Social
Insurance, Unemployment, and Workers’ Compensation had an effect on two or more of the
Macro Dependent Variables. The areas of Health, Housing, Retirement, and Veteran spending
had an effect on only one Macro Dependent Variable. Welfare spending was not significant on
any Macro Dependent Variable regression.
The first stage process predicted social spending, using equation (3), for each social
spending category based on past spending, additional independent variables, and lags of the
Macro Dependent Variables. To avoid correlation and to factor out the effects of GDP and
Income/PCE independently, such that the appropriate residuals in the second stage regressions
on each Macro Dependent Variable are used, regressions of each Macro Dependent Variable are
done separately and divided between two tables (Table 5 and 6). Table 5 is spending
predictions utilizing GDPpC, but not IpC or PCEpC as an independent variable. Table 6 is
spending predictions utilizing IpC and/or PCEpC, but not GDPpC as an independent variable.
Because of the high correlation between IpC and PCEpC, typically only one or the other was
significant. Though GDPpC, IpC, and PCEpC were independently significant in many equations,
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adding controls made them insignificant in the best regression for predicting some spending
variables. This was true for Employee Retirement, Housing & Community Development, Social
Insurance, Veteran Services, & Welfare. In these cases, the regressions repeat in both tables for
easy comparison.
V.1.1. State and Local Government Finances’ Effects on GDP per Capita.
In the second stage, GDPpC was analyzed in nine independent regressions, one for each
social spending variable of interest, to see if any of the changes in the current and/or past three
lags of the residuals of the social spending variables were significant in predicting the Macro
Dependent Variables (Equations 4-6). These regressions included fixed year effects and the first
and second lag of GDPpC, but no other controls. For GDPpC, only for Education, Housing, and
Workers Compensation were significant (Table 7, Columns 1-3).
For Education, only the third lag of the change in spending in education was significant
at 0.10%. This, however, has the unexpected sign of -0.74, or rather, for every dollar spent on
education, not associated with an increase in GDP, GDPpC decreases by 74 cents. This is a
significant difference from a simple regression, which does not utilize residuals; in this model, a
one-dollar change in the current year of Education spending was a 46 cent increase in the
change in GDPpC. Combining the social spending variables of significance together (Table 7,
Column 4) made education slightly more significant, but once controls were added to the
equation, Education was dropped all together (Table 7, Column 5). From this, we can conclude,
with regard to State and Local Finances, that education, independent of GDP has a slightly
negative, but insignificant effect on GDP.
For Housing and Community Development, we see that the second lag has a positive
effect of 4.5 at 1% significance and the third lag has an effect of -2.49 at 10% significance. When
combined with the other spending variables in column 4, only the second lag is significant. With
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controls, neither remain significant. These effects remain similar when regressing on the initial
values as opposed to the residuals. Ultimately, these findings show government spending on
Housing and Community Development has an overall positive yet insignificant effect.
The residuals of change in Workers’ Compensation had a positive effect on GDPpC. This
was initially true for the current year, the first lag and the third lag at 1% or less. When
combined with the other spending variables and controls, the first lag dropped, while the
current year had a multiplying effect of 10.9 and was significant only at 10%, while the third lag
remained significant at 1% with a multiplying effect of 21.2. The overall effect remained the
same. An increase in spending on Workers Compensation, not associated with an increase in
GDP, results in a very significant and powerful increase in GDPpC.
V.1.2. State and Local Government Finances’ Effects on Income per Capita.
Having already accomplished the first stage of predicting social spending variables, the
second stage process repeats for IpC and PCEpC analysis. Initial independent regressions (Table
8, columns 1-4), with no controls, was significant for current Education spending; the third lag of
Social Insurance spending; the second lag of Unemployment Compensation; and the current,
first and third lag of Workers’ Compensation. Upon combining and adding in controls, (Table 8,
Column 6,) Education, Social Insurance, and the current and first lag of Workers Compensation
remained significant. A change in each dollar spent on Education had a positive increase of
$1.17 in IpC, and a dollar spent on Social Insurance had a positive increase of $21.45 in IpC, but
both were only significant at 10%. The only overlapping social spending variable with GDP is
Workers’ Compensation; the change in spending in the current year had a $10.01 increase in IpC
at 5% significance, while its one-year lag had a positive increase of $21.63 in IpC at 0.01%
significance. Unemployment compensation, without controls (Table 8, Columns 3 and 5), had a
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negative impact of $1.78 at a significance of 1%. However, after adding controls, Column 6,
unemployment compensation became insignificant.
V.1.3. State and Local Government Finances’ Effects on PCE per Capita.
Initial results for PCEpC using reduced regressions with no controls (Table 9, columns 16) of the social spending residuals from Table 6, were significant for Education, Employee
Retirement, Health, Social Insurance, Unemployment Compensation and Veteran Services.
Besides Employee Retirement, all were significant when combined together and with controls.
Again, like GDPpC, Education had a negative impact on PCEpC. Each increase in dollar
spent on Education for the current year resulted in a $0.31 decrease in PCEpC at a 10%
significance. In addition, Unemployment Compensation also had a negative impact of $1.32 for
each increase in dollar spent of the current year.
Health, Social Insurance, and Veteran Services all had a positive effect on PCEpC. The
second lag of Health, significant at 1%, resulted in a $1.67 increase in PCEpC for each change in
dollar spent that year. Social Insurance spending, both the current year and the third lag, had a
$5.00 (at 5% significance) and $7.08 (at 1% significance) increase in PCEpC respectively. Finally,
Veteran Services resulted in a large and very significant (0.1%) increase in PCEpC of $23.56 for
each increase in dollar spent.
V.2. Federal Aid and Individual Transfer Payments
Federal analysis, using data from the US Census’s Federal Aid to States and Federal
Transfer Payments to Individuals tables, mirrors the categories of OECD international analysis.
Here the variables of interest were Family, Health, Housing, Incapacity, Labor, Old Age,
Unemployment, and Other. Results had short-term positive economic effects for Housing,
Incapacity and Other. However, Family, Health, Labor, Old Age and Unemployment had
short-term negative effects.

23

30000

GDP per Capita (Dollars)
40000
50000
60000

70000

Figure 4. Federal Aid and Transfer Payments to Individuals vs Same Year GDP, 1997─2010
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Figure 5. Federal Aid and Transfer Payments to Individuals vs Same Year GDP by State,
1997─2010
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An initial plot, with no controls, of all federal spending shows a positive correlation with
same year GDPpC of $0.57 at 5% significance and an R2 of 0.0089 (FIgure 4). In comparison,
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when we control for each state using fixed effects, Figure 5, the coefficient increases to $1.913
for each dollar of spending while the within R2 increases to 0.3591.
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Figure 6. Difference in Federal Aid and Transfer Payments to Individuals vs Same Year GDP,
1997─2010
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In Figure 6, we can see that an increase in the change of social spending is associated
with a lower GDPpC of -$2.186 (0.1% significance) for the same year. Note that Figure 6 does
not utilize the residuals for IVs. Though the overall trend seems to be postive, the marginal
benefit decreases as GDP increases. The negative impacts on GDP can be due to either direct
negative effects of federal social spending, where at a certain amount, the poor are enabled to
remain poor, or because as a state’s GDP declines, the government is stepping in with increased
social spending. Further, lags of the change in social spending became insignificant in the first
and second year, but the third lag had an opposite and very small positive effect of $0.315 at
10% significance.
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To isolate the direction of the causation, the same methods for State and Local Data are
used. The first stage predicted federal social spending categories (Equation 3) using past
spending, additional independent variables, and lags of the Macro Dependent Variables. Again,
to avoid correlation and factor out the effects of GDP and Income/PCE independently, the
regressions on GDP and Income/PCE were done separately (Table 10 and 11 respectively). In
this data set, GDPpC was significant for each regression in Table 10 and Ipc and/or PCEpC were
significant both with and without controls.
V.2.1. Federal Aid and Transfer Payments’ Effects on GDP per Capita.
Proceeding in the same manner as in the second stage of the State and Local Data
analysis, the only variable that had a positive effect on GDPpC, utilizing Equation 4, with Federal
Data (Table 12) was the third lag of Housing. With no controls, Housing, at 1% significance, had
a short-term positive effect with a $10.2 increase in GDPpC for each dollar spent. With controls,
the effect increased to $11.2 while the significance decreased to 5%.
Spending on Labor, Old Age, and Unemployment all had negative effects within the
Federal Data on GDPpC. Labor, without controls, had a negative effect on GDPpC of -$12.36 per
dollar spent (5% significance). With controls, this had its significance increase to 1% and its
effect nearly double to -$21.16 per dollar spent. The standard deviations for Labor, 6.5 and 4.8
with and without controls respectively, indicate the actual dollar decrease on GDPpC most likely
lies between -$12.36 and -$21.16. The second lag of Old Age had a negative effect of -$5.50
without controls and was significant at 0.1%. However, it became insignificant when combined
other spending variables and controls. Finally, only the third lag of Unemployment spending had
any effect. In this case it was a -$2.63 (10% significance) without controls, and a -$5.86 effect
(5% significance) with controls.
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V.2.2. Federal Aid and Transfer Payments’ Effects on Income per Capita.
IpC saw positive impacts from Housing, Incapacity and Other (Table 13). Housing’s third
lag had a positive impact at $12.65 with controls for each dollar spent and remained significant
at 0.1% in all regressions. Incapacity was significant at only 10%; its largest effect was with
controls at $3.69. The first lag of Other showed a positive increase in IpC of $1.75 with 10%
significance without controls, but became insignificant when controls were added.
Negative effects on IpC came from Family, Labor, and Unemployment; none of which
had a significance greater than 5% (Table 13). The impact of Family spending’s 1st lag,
initially -$2.23 at 10% significance, became insignificant with controls. Lag three of Labor and
lag two of Unemployment spending changes were -$8.03 and -$2.07 respectively (5%
significance). With controls, unemployment was dropped and labor increased to -$10.96.
In another approach, the regression is simplified to no Year dummy variables, no lags of
IpC, and no controls. IpC is regressed one spending variable at a time on the residuals. With this
approach, the only significant variable in predicting income is the third lag of Housing.
V.2.3. Federal Aid and Transfer Payments’ Effects on PCE per Capita.
In all cases, except Other, social spending residuals had a negative effect on PCEpC
(Table 14). This is true for Health, Labor, Old Age, and Unemployment spending residuals. Only
Labor and Other, both with and without controls, were significant at 1%; all other variables were
significant at 5% without controls. Old Age became insignificant with controls.
A dollar spent on Health or Labor decreased PCE $0.33 or $6.68, respectively, three
years after the fact. Unemployment’s second lag decreased PCEpC by $1.04. Spending on Other
increased PCEpC by $1.35. Federal aid contributed to an overall negative short term effect on
PCEpC.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
This section summarizes the results from Section V into categories of social spending to
compile and explain the results. Where relevant, comparisons are made to previous authors’
outcomes. The analyses below pull their conclusions primarily from data presented in Tables 79 and 12-14.
VI.1. Education
Education, as the Federal Government does not fund it, has its analysis limited to State
and Local data. Here, changes in GDPpC and PCEpC are negative, while its effects on income are
positive (Tables 7-9). Horváth et al. (2014) reference research in which only six of 19 studies
indicated a significant positive impact on state growth, with the remaining having the opposite
or no effects – consistent with this study. Note that the focus of this study is on marginal effects,
not overall effects. Additionally, Horvath et al. cited that K-12 spending exhibited no influence
and higher education showed negative growth.
Breaking down State and Local spending into K-12 and Higher education exhibited
slightly different results for the short term impacts. Simplifying the analysis and focusing on
only the education variables, year fixed effects and Macro Dependent Variables, current higher
education spending is not significant in short term GDP, but its second lag has a positive effect
of a $1.57 increase for each change in dollar spent on income (p-value 0.072, R2 = .4903). Lower
education had the opposite effects, with no impact on income, and a negative impact of $0.83
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(p-value 0.038, R2 = .3648) on GDPpC for the third lag of K-12 education spending. The
individual effect for K-12 and higher education spending was insignificant on PCEpC.
The results indicate that additional education spending, in the short term, hurts GDP –
probably through taxes. However, when these funds are spent on higher education, the net is
zero; more or higher quality graduates go into better jobs, stimulating the economy.
Additionally, education spending increases income with the majority of the impact coming from
inputs into higher education. A decrease in PCE could be expected if lower income families and
students, who receive the bulk of education spending, attempt to save more money for
additional investment into education. Though government education subsidies make education
a realistic goal, where it may not have been before, it does not provide full benefits; requiring
additional input from families and taking away from personal consumption.
VI.2. Family & Health
Both Family and Health had negative impacts in the Federal data. Family only affected
income by -$2.23 per change in dollar spent and only when regressed separately without
controls. Federal health spending had a negative impact of about one-third of a dollar, both
with and without controls, on PCEpC. There were no significant Health effects on GDPpC or IpC
in Federal Data.
Family and Health spending from Federal data is equivalent to the Public Welfare
variable in State and Local Data, (this includes TANF and Medicaid,) and was not significant on
either GDPpC, IpC, or PCEpC. The Health var iable in State and Local Data, unlike Federal Data,
represents public health services and programs other than hospital care. The majority of the
spending on hospital services is from Federal aid.
Other research by Horváth (2014) found health spending, through the Department of
Health and Human Services, to be negative on GDP, while Furceri & Zdzienicka (2012) found a
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positive large effect. Furceri (2010) also found that health spending smoothed income
fluctuations. Here, total public health spending on programs and services (State and Local Data)
had significant positive effects on PCEpC of about $1.67 per change in dollar spent.
A further analysis examines only the Transfer Payments to Individuals as opposed to the
combination of all federal spending. By including any significant controls, and utilizing the same
methodology outlined in Section IV, a result more in line with Horváth (2014) is found for
GDPpC. The second lag of health spending (on individuals) results in an increase of $0.98 in
GDPpC per increase in dollar spent (5% significance, Adj R2 = 0.3453); indicating that government
run programs have too much overhead or lack benefits associated with the direct payments to
individuals. We can see these results in Figure 7 below.
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Figure 7. Federal Health Transfer Payments to Individuals, 1997─2010
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VI.3. Housing
In both data sets, housing had an overall positive effect on all the Macro Dependent
Variables where it was significant. In the Federal data, this amounted to over a $10 effect per
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change in dollar spent on both GDP and Income per Capita. This is true both with and without
controls. In the State and Local data, we also found an overall positive effect on GDPpC, but
only without controls. This is the opposite of Furceri & Zdzienicka (2012), whose data shows a
negative small impact on GDP.
Supplementing housing may give individuals the chance to make immediate and direct
changes to their lives. It frees up income for other needs and allows time to be dedicated to
other endeavors like education or other areas of human capital investment. PCE should not be
expected to change; low-income individuals, who receive housing subsidies, will tend to
continue to spend their entire paycheck to meet basic needs.
VI.4. Incapacity
This facet of social spending includes Workers’ Compensation and Supplemental
Security Income. In all cases where significant, Incapacity had positive results, which is in line
with those from Furceri (2010) and Furceri & Zdzienicka (2012).
In Federal Data, for the Incapacity variable, we saw no changes in GDP or PCE. However,
there was a slight positive effect, but only with 10% significance, on IpC from spending in the
current period. The analysis of Workers’ Compensation in State and Local Data further
substantiate these results with large and highly significant effects on both GDPpC and IpC, but
no effects on PCEpC. For both GDPpC and IpC, the current period shows a positive impact of
$10 per change in dollar spent, but only at 10% significance. Additionally, the combined lagged
values of Workers’ Compensation spending is significant at less than 1% and as low as 0.1%,
depending on the period, with a positive impact of about $21 dollars per increase in dollar spent
on both GDPpC and IpC.
Individuals on Workers’ Compensation may spend their income on only necessary goods
while they search out new jobs, hence the lack of impact on PCE. Further, giving individuals the
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time to search out jobs that parallel their skills, instead of settling, not only increases their own
income, but, according to the data, helps the economy as well.
VI.5. Labor
Federal data for Labor primarily constitutes various forms of workforce and workforce
education investment. It has no State and Local Data equivalent. For every Macro Dependent
Variable, Labor has a negative, large, and significant effect ranging from $5 to $21. Concerning
GDPpC, labor is significant at 5% in the current year only and its impact increase from -$12.35 to
-$21.10 when controls are added. For IpC, Labor has an effect ranging from -$8 to -$11 (at 5%
significance) both with and without controls. Finally, for PCEpC, Labor’s significance increases to
1%, but its effect is less, though still large, and amounts to -$6.68 with controls per dollar spent.
These effects are not surprising in the short term. People that are learning new trades
are less likely to be in the workforce earning income and contributing to GDP. With less income,
they are spending less. These negative effects are in line with both Horváth (2014) and Furceri
& Zdzienicka (2012). Any positive effects from labor investment would most likely come from
long-term benefits.
VI.6. Old Age
Not surprisingly, Old Age had a negative effect – consistent with prior studies. In
Federal data, the negative effect on both GDPpC and PCEpC was true for two years after
spending the money. Employee Retirement spending, from State and Local data, a subset of Old
Age spending within Federal Data, also showed a negative effect in the second lag on PCE.
Though Old Age spending was highly significant on GDP without controls (0.1%), it
became insignificant with the controls. This was similarly true for PCE in both Federal Data and
State and Local Data analyses, where PCE was significant at 10% without controls and then
became insignificant with controls.
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Old Age spending, though negative, may be far less impactful when put into perspective
of other spending and social factors. It is easy to imagine that regardless of who pays, someone
is paying for the elderly; be it the government or the family. For example, when the
government pays for the elderly, this money must be raised through taxes, leaving familes with
less money to spend – decreasing PCEpC. However, if old age spending is passed on to families,
the families will spend their now non-taxed income on the elderly – increasing PCE. The
necessity of this expenditure may partially explain why Old Age spending becomes insignificant
when combined with other factors. The question left for someone else to answer is whether
there are any unintended consequences of deciding who funds this expense.
VI.7. Unemployment
In Federal Data, we notice short-term negative effects across the board with
Unemployment. Meanwhile, in State and Local Data, we find no effect on GDPpC and a negative
effect on IpC and PCEpC. Keep in mind the varying definitions of unemployment in the data. In
State and Local Data, Unemployment is the money put away each year by each state into a
trust. Federal data on the other hand, utilizing the money provided by states, is the amount of
money provided to individuals and its overhead. Further analysis of unemployment on GDPpC,
utilizing only the portion of spending that represents transfer payments to individuals (to
exclude overhead from Federal Data), gives similar results. This analysis uses state and year
fixed effects instead of differencing to predict GDPpC.
First, we predict the residuals of unemployment spending using only GDP and its lags
with fixed effects for states and years. This has a within R2 of 0.8347. Using the 2nd lag of the
residual, also with year and state fixed effects, results in a negative effect of $4.38 for each
dollar spent on unemployment, a p-value of 0.016, and a within R2 of 0.3015. This is similar to
the original results and is visualized in Figure 8 (below) where different colors represent
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different states. Running the same variable directly on GDPpC, without the method above to
isolate the effects of GDPpC on Unemployment, the coefficient increases in effect to -10.31 (R2 =
0.4815 and p-value = 0.000). What this helps to show is that GDPpC plays a significant role in
unemployment spending. Since GDPpC decreases more when not controlled for, we can deduce
that the amount of GDPpC does play a role in how we allocate money to unemployment
spending – a higher GDPpC results in less unemployment spending. Similar results were found
for IpC and PCEpC.
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Figure 8. Federal Unemployment Aid to Individuals vs GDP per Capita by State, 1997─2010
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VI.8. Other
Other social spending includes a number of special projects. These seem to have
positive effects, specifically on Income and PCE. In the Federal Data this amounted to around
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$1.70 for both Income and PCE at 10% and 1% significance respectively. Other special
programs, like Veteran spending, specifically from the State and Local data, showed large
($23.56) increases in PCEpC that are highly significant (0.1%).
These economic gains are most likely due to the highly concentrated and specific efforts
and areas that these programs target. This is opposed to the broad base of other programs like
TANF or food stamps.
VI.9. Political Insight
This study also garners some insight into the political motivation and timing for social
spending through Voting Year variables. In particular, the year just prior to and coinciding with a
a congressional voting year. The significance of these years is such that they are not
overshadowed by presidential elections. Therefore, congressional representatives are more
inclined to follow through on promises or pander to the desires of their constituents. In Tables
5-14, we find that Labor Spending is positive in both these years, while welfare spending (from
State and Local Data and consisting of TANF, Medicaid and Social Security Income) goes down
only during an election year. Prior analysis indicated that Labor spending has large and positive
effects in the current year only. This bodes well for politicians, as they can make a clear impact
on their constituents immediately through Labor spending while they or their party run for
reelection. Welfare spending on the other hand may go down during an election year because
its effects are less noticeable, as indicated by this paper’s analysis (where we saw no significant
effects to any of the Macro Dependent Variables), and therefore, after having taken office,
politicians decrease its spending and redistribute it to other areas. We also see that
Congressional Voting Years are associated with positive trends in GDPpC, IpC and PCEpC.
In no case was the party in office ever significant in predicting either the amount of any
social spending variable, GDPpC, IpC or PCEpC. This is perhaps due to the tempering of the
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opposing parties in office or even a necessity at the local level to overlook bipartisanship to
solve immediate problems and not ideologies. Governor Turnover had negative effects on Labor
and Other in two periods after coming to office. This coincides with Labor’s relationship to
voting years. Politicians after establishing themselves in office, are free to decrease labor
benefits for other programs without reprisal from constituents. Turnover also had positive
effects on Retirement and Housing in the 3rd period after coming into office; likely, due to the
time it takes to revamp these programs. The period after governor turnover had Negative
effects on IpC; perhaps fueled by an (unnecessary) uncertainty in the economy from newly
implement governor programs. Though these ideas are speculation, it is clear that the direction
of individual politicians, in congress or the governor’s office, does play a role in social spending.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The focus of this study is limited primarily to short-term marginal effects. To generalize
the results, Housing, Incapacity, Workers’ Compensation and Other had positive effects, while
Family, Health, Labor, Unemployment and Old Age had negative effects. Most of the variables
were consistent between State and Local Data and Federal Data as well as with prior studies.
However, differences in the direction of the effect from other studies were found for Health, Old
Age and Unemployment. There is a strong and obvious correlation between GDP and total
social spending, with the causation of the independent social spending variables having both
positive and negative impacts. The same is true for income. PCE tended to decrease with
increases in social spending. In the short-term, focusing on incapacity and housing benefits did
the most benefit for state economies and individual welfare.
Note that negative results, such as those for unemployment, do not necessarily indicate
that all short-term unemployment spending is bad. Instead, they indicate that this type of social
spending may simply be above equilibrium. The same holds true for those with positive results,
such as Workers’ Compensation; where at some point spending too much may start to garner
less positive results of even declining results. Adjusting policy and funds to cope for
overspending in certain areas and too much prudence in others, may help bring not just higher
growth rates in GDP, but higher standards of living for everyone.
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Table 1. Macro Dependent Variables
Variable
Gross Domestic Product
Income Per Capita
Personal Consumption Expenditure

Details
By state, 1997 – 2013, Dollars
By state, 1997 – 2013, Dollars
By state, 1997 – 2012, Dollars

*GDP, Income and Consumption data is compiled from tables provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Table 2. Independent Variables: State and Local Government Finances*
Main Category
Sub Category
% of Total
Definition
Expenditures#
Education

All Education

29.29%

Social Services

Public Welfare

14.36%

Health

2.66%

Employment Security
Administration

2.45%

Veterans' Services

0.03%

Housing and
Community
Development

Housing and Community
Development

1.48%

Insurance Trust
Expenditure

Unemployment
Compensation

1.84%

Employee Retirement

5.56%

Workers' Compensation

0.51%

Includes higher, elementary & secondary, and
other education.
Includes: 1) Direct payments to beneficiaries
under the Federal categorical public assistance
programs, Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF); and Medicaid, 2) Cash payments made
directly to individuals contingent upon their
need, 3) Payments made directly to private
vendors for medical assistance and hospital or
health care and for services and commodities,
and 4) Welfare capital expenditures and
employment.
Provision of services for the conservation and
improvement of public health, other than
hospital care, and financial support of other
governments' health programs.
Administration of unemployment
compensation systems, public employment
services, and the Federal Social Security,
Medicare, and Railroad Retirement trusts.
Administration of veterans bonus payments
and other veterans services NOT classifiable
under Public Welfare, Education, Health,
Hospitals, Social Insurance Administration, or
any other major function.
Construction, operation, and support of
housing and redevelopment projects and other
activities to promote or aid public and private
housing and community development.
Funds held by the U.S. Treasury in a trust
account maintained for each participating
government by the cooperative Federal-state
unemployment compensation insurance
system.
Cash and security holdings of governmentadministered retirement systems for public
employees.
Cash and security holdings of state government
compulsory accident and injury insurance
systems for workers' compensation.

* State and Local Finance data can be found at https://www.census.gov/govs/local/. The years 2001 and 2003 do not have stateby-state statistics available. The Methodology for Summary Tabulations section, from the Government Finance and Employment
Classification Manual (http://www2.census.gov/govs/class/classfull.pdf), provided information to consolidate and rearrange data for
2001 and 2003 to create a state-by-state comparison, however, no CV statistics are available. The same manual is the source of
definitions for the above variables.
#
Percent of expenditures represents the mean of All Expenditures for all states for all years of this study (1997-2012)
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Table 3. Independent Variables: Federal Aid to State and Local Governments & Government
Transfer Payments to Individuals by State
Variable of
Federal Aid to State and Local
Transfer Payments to
% of Total
Study
Governments
Individuals
Aid#
Social Security Administration
DOL - Older American Programs
DHHS - Administration on Aging
Social Security Benefits
Railroad Retirement and
Disability Benefits
Other Government Retirement
and Disability Insurance Benefit
Veterans Pension and Disability
Benefits

Old Age
[31.378%]

Incapacity
[3.275%]

Health
[42.375%]

Special Education and Rehabilitative
Services
Workers’ Compensation
Supplemental Security Income Benefits
FNS – Child Nutrition Programs
FNS – Commodity Assistance Programs
FNS – Needy Family Programs
FNS – Special Supplemental Food
Program (WIC)
DHHS - Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality
DHHS - Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services
DHHS - Health Resources and Services
Administration
DHHS – Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration

[2.185%]

Unemployment

Housing
[2.404%]

0.004
9.253
0.267
0.148
31.816
0.097
0.059
0.164
0.01

State Unemployment Insurance and
Employment Service
Welfare to Work Program

0.141
1.714
0.216
0.011

Unemployment Insurance
Compensation
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1.934

0.254

Veterans Readjustment Benefits
Education and Training
Assistance

Community Facilities Grants
Rural Housing and Rural Business
Cooperative Service
Rural, Regional, and Cooperative
Development Programs
Mutual and Self Help Housing Grants
Housing Preservation Grants
Rental Assistance Payments
College Housing
Home Ownership Assistance
Housing for Special Populations

0.224

0.835
1.833
0.611
0.011
0.011

DOE – Vocational and Adult Education
DHHS – Job Opportunities and Basic Skills
DOL – Workforce Investment
DOL – Veterans’ Employment and
Training Administration

[2.506%]

0.65

0.589

Medical Benefits

Labor

0.002
0.11
0.077
28.381

2.279
0.003
0.071
0.005
0.001
0.001
0.068
0.002
0.09
0.058

Table 3 cont. Independent Variables: Federal Aid to State and Local Governments &
Government Transfer Payments to Individuals by State
Variable of
Federal Aid to State and Local
Transfer Payments to
% of Total
Study
Governments
Individuals
Aid#

Housing
(Continued)

Family
[4.379%]

Low Rent Housing Assistance
Section 8 Programs
Public Housing (1997 only)
Housing Certificate Program
Capital Programs
Support Services
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP) [Food Stamps]
Child Care and Development
Child Support Enforcement
Children and Family Services (Head Start)
Safe and Stable Families
Foster Care and Adoption Assistance
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF)

0.438
0.54
0.379
0.601
0.145
0.002
0.155
0.228
0.136
0.425
0.02
0.277
0.786
Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP)
Family Assistance

Other
[3.791%]

Water Systems and Waste Disposal
Systems Grants
Appalachian Regional Commission
Low Income Home Energy Assistance
Refugee and Entrant Assistance
Tennessee Valley Authority
Department of Veterans Affairs

0.885
0.049

Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
Income Maintenance Benefits Excluding Family Assistance
#

1.467

0.005
0.148
0.013
0.023
0.046
2.015
1.492

Percent of aid represents the mean of all Federal Aid and all Transfer Payments to Individuals for all states for all years of this study
(1997-2010). Category totals for Federal Aid are in brackets “[…]” in the Variable of Study column.
Note 1: Total aid does not add to 100%. Not all Aid from both programs fit into the stated categories. Total aid analyzed amounts to
92.28% of all Federal Aid to States and all Transfer Payments to Individuals.
Note 2: Not all programs span the full range of years of this study.
Note 3: Data for Federal Aid to States comes from Statistical Abstracts, Section 8,
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html, while data for Transfer Payments to Individuals comes from Statistical
Abstracts, Section 11, http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html. For further details on individual variable
definitions, please see: https://www.census.gov/govs/school/definitions.html, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD,
http://www.dol.gov/, and http://www.acf.hhs.gov/.
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Table 4. Control Variables
Category
Age Distribution
Population growth
Race Distribution
Educational Attainment
Labor Force Rate
Unemployment Rate
Exports
Imports
Initial Debt to GDP
Debt to GDP Average
Spending to GDP
Election dummies
Initial level of the ratio of total
social spending to GDP
Race
TopIncomeShares
Electoral: Voting Year
Electoral: Executive Turnover
Gini Index
Theil Index

Definition
Includes two dummy variables: under 15 and over 65. Constant is all ages in
between.
Change in population
Vector of percentages of racial breakdown by state
Only years available 2009, 2007, 2003, 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997. Includes high
school and Bachelors plus
Includes: Men, Women, & Teen
Unemployment ratio for male and female for civilian noninstitutional population,
16 years old and over
Foreign exports by state of origin, Millions of Dollars
Foreign imports by state of destination, Millions of Dollars
Outstanding debt in 1997 (from State and Local Government Finances) divided by
1997 GDP
Average of Debt to GDP over all years
Ratio of all spending to GDP
For who which party controls governor seat for the year. Constant is Other.
Dummy for Republican. Second Dummy for Democrat.
Total of all social spending from 1997 (from State and Local Government Finances)
divided by 1997 GDP
White, Black, Asian, Native American
Values available for top 10, 5, 1, .5, .1 & .01 % of income earners
Includes separate variables for Presidential and Congressional voting years. Also,
includes cross-section of both.
Variable with 0 for incumbent still in office and 1 for new governor elected.
Number increases for each additional governor to serve in the corresponding year.
Index of dispersion of income distribution. Source: Frank et al. 2015.
Index of distributional entropy of income. Source: Frank et al. 2015.
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Table 5. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of Independent Variables Using GDP

Independent Variable
Adjusted R2
Of Interest.D.L1
Of Interest.D.L2

(1)

(2)

(3)

Education

Employee
Retirement

Health

0.4466
-0.2681
[0.0360]

.2447
-0.2089
[0.0398]

0.6161
-0.5522
[0.0360]
0.1852
[0.0451]

Of Interest.D.L3
Of Interest^2.D.L1
Of Interest^2.D.L2
Of Interest^2.D.L3

0.0004
[0.0001]
-0.0003
[0.0001]
0.0002
[0.0000]

0.1225
[0.0324]
0.0007
[0.0001]
-0.0010
[0.0001]

-0.1639
[0.0417]

(4)
Housing &
Community
Development
.5054
0.1272*
[0.0380]
-0.1406
[0.0303]
0.1710
[0.0346]

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Social
Insurance

Unemployment

Veteran
Services

Welfare

Workers’
Compensation

.2735
-0.3224
[0.0376]
-0.2126
[0.0402]
-0.1137*
[0.0379]
-0.0037
[0.0006]

.5252

-0.2950
[0.0579]
-0.0005*
[0.0001]

-0.0011
[0.0001]
0.0002*
[0.0001]

0.0054
[0.0011]
-0.0071
[0.0011]

0.0002*
[0.0001]
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0.01788
[0.0044]
0.0268
[0.0050]
0.0035*
[0.0010]

GDP per Capita.D.L3

-0.4574
[0.0330]
-0.0808*
[0.0258]

-0.0011
[0.0001]
-0.0007
[0.0001]

-0.0272
[0.0023]
-0.0006
[0.0024]
0.0202
[0.0023]

0.0016**
[0.0008]

Unemployment.D
Unemployment.D.L1
Unemployment.D.L2
Unemployment.D.L3
Teen Unemployment.D.L2
Pop Asian.D

0.3846

0.00636
[0.0011]

GDP per Capita.D

GDP per Capita.D.L2

.4779
-0.3011
[0.0446]

0.0135*
[0.0045]

IpC.D

GDP per Capita.D.L1

.2177
0.2824
[0.0403]
-0.3271
[0.0402]

3.2162
[0.8049]
4.2206
[0.7618]
2.3938
[0.6247]

1.3282***
[0.7078]

29.4793
[7.9288]

25.4626**
[10.9006]

0.9355**
[0.4296]

Table 5 cont. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of Independent Variables Using GDP

Independent Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

Education

Employee
Retirement

Health

(4)
Housing &
Community
Development

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Social
Insurance

Unemployment

Veteran
Services

Welfare

Workers’
Compensation

-3.3617
[0.9437]

Pop Black.D
-20.7815
[4.5634]

Pop Black.D.L
22.6081**
[10.7687]
-23.3059***
[13.0625]
-51.7298
[14.4001]

Pop Native American.D.L1
Pop Native American.D.L1
Pop Native American.D.L1
Pop White.D

-9.0296
[0.9423]
-2.4679*
[0.7874]
-4.7884
[0.8804]
-16.6599**
[7.3489]

Pop White.D.L1
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Pop White.D.L2
Pop White.D.L3
Pop 35-54.D

-1.2173
[0.2965]

Pop 55-64.D.L3
4.2117*
[1.3471]

Pop 65 Plus.D
23.5444***
[13.4950]

Pop 65 Plus.D.L2

-1.1219
[0.2535]

Pop Growth Rate

PopBachPlus.D

-28.9713***
[14.7749]

26.0838
[4.5500]

Pop 55-64.D.L1

PopHSOnly.D

-0.1486
[0.0376]

15.2851*
[5.189623]
23.0431
[5.822224]

-0.2048**
[0.0905]

Table 5 cont. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of Independent Variables Using GDP

Independent Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

Education

Employee
Retirement

Health

861.4779
[100.0864]
661.9227
[130.5992]
580.4008
[125.9116]

Spending to GDP.D#
Spending to GDP.D.L2#
Spending to GDP.D.L3#

655.8933
[82.9215]

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Social
Insurance

Unemployment

Veteran
Services

Welfare

Workers’
Compensation

982.4824
[141.0865]

-56.7661**
[22.1210]
-0.0045
[0.0008]

351.1803
[95.4749]

-969.5694**
[405.3167]
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-769.6697**
[338.9082]
-15.4579
[3.9759]

Theil.D
Exports.D
11.8224*
[3.7353]

Turnover.L3

23.3756
[3.0312]
9.1826**
[3.7327]
1.9989*
[0.6569]

Voting Year Congressional

Income Shares Top 10.D

21.8462*
[7.8908]
28.4879*
[8.2812]

-16.5180*
[5.8045]

Gini.D.L3#

Voting Year
Congressional.L3

148.6685**
[61.7673]

844.56
[167.1211]

194.1547
[39.7606]

AllRevenueSaL.D
Gini.D.L1#

(5)

-63.3903*
[24.0938]

Debt2GDP.D
Debt2GDP.D.L2

(4)
Housing &
Community
Development

-41.0885*
[13.6723]

101.6427
[13.5872]
0.7551
[0.1817]

-1.9503*
[0.7453]
#
The difference of Spending to GDP represents a ratio with a value between -0.04 and 0.05. The difference of the Gini ratio has a value between -0.05 and .13. Even with large coefficients, the total
effect is within an expected range.
Note 1: Year fixed effects, if significant, included but not reported.
Note 2: *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Default is significant at 0.1%. The values within “[…]” are standard errors.
Note 3: “of Interest” represents lags of the columns dependent variable.
Income Shares Top 10.D.L1

Table 6. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of Independent Variables Using Income/PCE

Independent Variable
Adjusted R2
Of Interest.D.L1
Of Interest.D.L2

(1)

(2)

(3)

Education

Employee
Retirement

Health

0.4466
-0.2682
[0.0359]

0.2170
-0.1823
[0.0393]

0.6612
-0.5732
[0.0412]
0.1220**
[0.0502]

Of Interest.D.L3
Of Interest^2.D.L1
Of Interest^2.D.L2
Of Interest^2.D.L3

0.0003
[0.0001]
-0.0002*
[0.0001]
0.0002
[0.0000]

0.1225
[0.0324]
0.0007
[0.0001]
-0.0010
[0.0001]

-0.0879**
[0.0384]
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PCE.D.L1
PCE.D.L2

0.0391*
[0.0117]

PCE.D.L3
IpC.D
IpC.D.L1
IpC.D.L2
IpC.D.L3
Unemployment.D
Unemployment.D.L1
Unemployment.D.L2
Unemployment.D.L3

0.0219295*
[0.0064]
0.0205*
[0.0078]

0.5054
0.1271*
[0.0380]
-0.1406
[0.0303]
0.1710
[0.0346]

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Social
Insurance

Unemployment

Veteran
Services

Welfare

Workers’
Compensation

0.2735
-0.3224
[0.0376]
-0.2126
[0.0401]
-0.1137*
[0.0379]
-0.0037
[0.0006]

0.6184

-0.2897
[0.0585]
-0.0006
[0.0001]

-0.0011
[0.0001]
0.0002*
[0.0001]
0.0072
[0.0020]

PCE.D

(4)
Housing &
Community
Development

0.0041*
[0.0015]
0.0031**
[0.0014]

0.0399
[0.0058]
-0.0421
[0.0069]
-0.0218*
[0.0067]
0.0307
[0.0059]
-0.0120*
[0.0036]
-0.0188
[0.0037]
0.0121*
[0.0039]
0.0118*
[0.0039]
2.2054*
[0.7301]
2.7736
[0.6934]
1.5050*
[0.5641]

0.2177
0.2824
[0.0403]
-0.3271
[0.0401]

0.4779
-0.3011
[0.0446]

0.0054
[0.0011]
-0.0071
[0.0011]

0.0002*
[0.0001]

0.3877

-0.4611
[0.0330]
-0.0798*
[0.0257]

-0.0011
[0.0001]
-0.0007
[0.0001]
0.0042*
[0.0015]

0.0135*
[0.0045]

1.3282***

Table 6 cont. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of Independent Variables Using Income/PCE

Independent Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

Education

Employee
Retirement

Health

(4)
Housing &
Community
Development

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Social
Insurance

Unemployment

Veteran
Services

Welfare

Workers’
Compensation

0.9355**
[0.4296]

Teen Unemployment.D.L2

38.8790
[7.2324]

Pop Asian.D
-3.3617
[0.9437]

Pop Black.D
-20.7815
[4.5634]

Pop Black.D.L
22.6081**
[10.7687]
-23.3059***
[13.0625]
-51.7298
[14.4000]

Pop Native American.D.L1
Pop Native American.D.L1
Pop Native American.D.L1
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-7.6401
[0.8568]
-3.1831
[0.7165]
-4.9518
[0.8200]

Pop White.D
Pop White.D.L1
Pop White.D.L2

-0.1486
[0.0376]

Pop White.D.L3
-25.2205
[6.9634]

Pop 35-54.D

-28.9713***
[14.7749]

26.0838
[4.5500]

Pop 55-64.D.L1

-1.2173
[0.2965]

Pop 55-64.D.L3
4.2117*
[1.3471]

Pop 65 Plus.D
31.0746**
[13.0028]

Pop 75-84.D

-1.1219
[0.2535]

Pop Growth Rate
Pop High School Only.D

25.4626**
[10.9006]

10.3650**
[4.8241]

Table 6 cont. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of Independent Variables Using Income/PCE

Independent Variable
Pop Bach Plus.D
Spending to GDP.D
Spending to GDP.D.L1#
Spending to GDP.D.L2#
Spending to GDP.D.L3#

(1)

(2)

(3)

Education

Employee
Retirement

Health

15.8781*
[5.3879]
5116.823
[404.9407]
2414.913
[515.806]
-1157.247**
[512.3818]
-1075.188**
[434.0019]

(4)
Housing &
Community
Development

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Social
Insurance

Unemployment

Veteran
Services

Welfare

Workers’
Compensation

-0.2048**
[0.0905]
861.4779
[100.0864]

445.0847
[80.3101]

982.4824
[141.0865]

661.9227
[130.5992]
580.4008
[125.9116]

650.5896
[160.9259]

-63.3904*
[24.0938]

-16.5180*
[5.8045]

Debt to GDP.D.L2
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-0.0043
[0.0009]

All State and Local
Revenue.D

-769.6697**
[338.9082]

Gini.D.L3#
-15.4579
[3.9759]

Theil.D
Exports.D

Voting Year Congressional
Income Shares Top 10.D

21.8462*
[7.8908]
28.4879*
[8.2812]

194.1547
[39.7606]

Debt to GDP.D

Turnover.L3

178.4847*
[61.2156]

11.8224*
[3.7353]

23.3756
[3.0312]
9.1826**
[3.7327]
1.9989*
[0.6569]
0.7551
[0.1817]

-41.0885*
[13.6723]

-1.9503*
[0.7453]
#
The difference of Spending to GDP represents a ratio with a value between -0.04 and 0.05. The difference of the Gini ratio has a value between -0.05 and 0.13. Even with large coefficients, the total
effect is within an expected range.
Note 1: Year fixed effects, if significant, included but not reported.
Note 2: *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Default is significant at 0.1%. The values within “[…]” are standard errors.
Note 3: “of Interest” represents lags of the columns dependent variable.
Note 4: Employee Retirement, Housing & Community Development, Social Insurance, Veteran Services, & Welfare are repeated from Table 5.
Income Shares Top 10.D.L1

Table 7. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of GDP per Capita
Independent Variable
Adjusted R

2

Education Residuals.D.L3

(1)
GDPpC

(2)
GDPpC

(3)
GDPpC

0.3507

0.3641

0.4033

-0.7423***

(5)
GDPpC

0.4216

0.7301

-0.827**

[0.3995]

[0.4054]
4.4473*
[1.3293]

4.5087*
[1.3170]

Housing & Community Development Residuals.D.L2

(4)
GDPpC

-2.4874***

Housing & Community Development Residuals.D.L3

[1.3314]
9.9284* 10.4395* 10.9343***

Workers’ Compensation Residuals.D

Workers’ Compensation Residuals.D.L1

Workers’ Compensation Residuals.D.L3

[3.5957]

[3.5459]

[5.9314]

14.4193

14.4115

[3.2749]

[3.2246]

6.1413*

6.3748*

21.1939*

[2.0563]

[2.0264]

[5.9815]
0.5164

All State and Local Revenue.D

[0.0797]
149.7993**

Imports.D.L2

[57.3712]
-108126.5

Spending to GDP Ratio.D#

[13028.25]
149.6423*

Income Shares Top 10%.D.L

[50.2221]

#

The difference of Spending to GDP represents a ratio with a value between -0.04 and 0.05. Even with large coefficients, the total
effect is within an expected range.
Note 1: Year fixed effects included, if significant, but not reported.
Note 2: GDP per Capita lags 1 and 2 included, but not reported.
Note 3: *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Default is significant at 0.1%. The values within “[…]” are standard
errors.

48

Table 8. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of Income per Capita
(1)
Independent
Variable
Adjusted R2

Education Residuals.D.
Social Insurance
Residuals.D.L3
Unemployment
Compensation
Residuals.D.L2
Workers’
Compensation
Residuals.D
Workers’
Compensation
Residuals..D.L1
Workers’
Compensation
Residuals.D.L3

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

IpC

IpC

IpC

IpC

IpC

IpC

0.4797

0.5046

.4922

0.5279

.5488

0.6799

0.7265*

1.4014*

1.1705***

[0.2664]

[0.4003]

[0.6072]

9.7290**

21.4545***

[4.8338]

[10.9410]

10.1925**
[4.9078]
-1.6357*

-1.7801**

[.6332]

[0.6840]
5.2475**

5.7132**

10.0133**

[2.5804]

[2.5434]

[4.3417]

9.2079

9.5620

21.6323

[2.3343]

[2.2954]

[3.9833]

4.1343*

4.0340*

[1.4625]

[1.4310]
-82.0429***

Imports.D.L1

[45.8333]
-34319.98*

Spending to GDP.D#

[9937.193]
-22242.83*

Spending to GDP.D.L3#

[8339.637]
1481.512*

Theil

[432.7402]
-249.8335***

Turnover.L1

[132.5071]
-125.7806***

Unemployment.D.L1

[65.2087]
815.8724*

Voting Year
Congressional

[250.4668]

#

The difference of Spending to GDP represents a ratio with a value between -0.04 and 0.05. Even with large coefficients, the total
effect is within an expected range.
Note 1: Year fixed effects included, if significant, but not reported
Note 2: Income per Capita lags 1 and 2 included, but not reported
Note 3: *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Default is significant at 0.1%. The values within “[…]” are standard
errors.
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Table 9. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of PCE per Capita
Independent Variable
Adjusted R2
Education Residuals.D.
Employee Retirement
Residuals.D.L2
Health Residuals.D.L1
Health Residuals.D.L2
Social Insurance Residuals.D
Social Insurance Residuals.D.L1
Social Insurance Residuals.D.L3
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Unemployment Compensation
Residuals.D
Unemployment Compensation
Residuals.D.L2
Veteran Services Residuals.D
All State and Local Revenue .D
Theil Index.D.L1
Income Shares Top 10%.D
Voting Year Congressional
Pop Asian.D
Pop Native American,D.L2
Pop Native American,D.L3
Pop 65 Plus.D.L1

(1)
PCEpC

(2)
PCEpC

(3)
PCEpC

(4)
PCEpC

(5)
PCEpC

(6)
PCEpC

(7)
PCEpC

(8)
PCEpC

0.7272
-0.2345***
[0.1371]

0.7253

0.7307

0.7206

0.7326

0.7085

0.7438
-0.3367***
[0.1752]

0.7973
-0.3104***
[0.1582]

-0.8292***
[0.4753]
0.8908***
[0.5382]
1.7635*
[0.5350]
5.5832***
[2.8526]
-5.1207***
[2.7503]
7.1040*
[2.3680]
-1.3543
[0.3318]
-0.6112***
[0.3370]
11.7698**
[5.8722]

0.9588***
[0.5495]
1.6695*
[0.5368]
7.4168*
[2.7396]
-5.0105***
[2.6498]
6.5999*
[2.2779]
-1.6404
[0.3258]
-0.5580
[0.3387]
24.6306
[6.9653]

1.6751*
[0.4790]
4.9953**
[2.4191]

7.0823*
[2.0214]
-1.3156
[0.2890]

23.5633
[6.3213]
0.0428*
[0.0144]
3231.897
[450.8065]
44.8560
[8.3269]
753.3457
[73.8440]
-190.7788**
[86.5403]
292.4115***
[152.6515]
583.8956*
[168.8836]
354.8843
[99.2069]

Table 9 cont. State and Local Government Finances – Prediction of PCE per Capita
Independent Variable

(1)
PCEpC

(2)
PCEpC

(3)
PCEpC

(4)
PCEpC

(5)
PCEpC

(6)
PCEpC

Pop High School Only.D
Pop Bachelors Plus
Note 1: Year fixed effects included, if significant, but not reported.
Note 2: PCE per Capita lags 1 and 3 included, but not reported, for columns 1-7. Only 1 lag include for column 8.
Note 3: *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Default is significant at 0.1%. The values within “[…]” are standard errors.

(7)
PCEpC

(8)
PCEpC
37.9349***
[19.3876]
59.5021*
[22.1921]
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Table 10. Federal Aid & Transfer Payments to Individuals – Prediction of Independent Variables Using GDP
Independent
Variable
2

Adjusted R

Of Interest.D.L1
Of Interest.D.L2

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Family

Health

Housing

Incapacity

Labor

Old Age

Unemployment

Other

.6931
-0.1260*
[0.0425]
-0.150529
[0.0371]

0.6345

.7296
-0.7562
[0.0320]
-0.4996
[0.0447]
-0.1510
[0.03267]
0.0027
[0.0005]

.4736

.8435
0.3040
[0.0542]

.9665
0.4024
[0.0654]
0.2154
[0.0373]
0.2711
[0.0387]
-0.0008
[0.0002]

.8562
0.1948
[0.0223]
-0.2419
[0.0521]

Of Interest.D.L3
Of Interest^2.D.L1
Of Interest^2.D.L2
Of Interest^2.D.L3

-0.4615
[0.0374]
-0.3253
[0.0469]
0.0004**
[0.0001]
-0.0012
[0.0001]
-0.0014
[0.0001]

0.0036
[0.0007]

-0.0013
[0.0003]

GDP per Capita.D
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GDP per
Capita.D.L1
GDP per
Capita.D.L2

-0.0016***
[0.0010]

0.01181**
[0.0046]

0.0010***
[0.0006]

0.0024**
[0.0010]

-0.0018
[0.0004]

-0.0023
[0.0007]
-0.0018*
[0.0006]
-0.0020*
[0.0007]

-14.2964**
[5.5949]

Pop Black.D.L

Pop 17 and
Under.D.L2

0.8590**
[0.3952]
-29.0549**
[11.9262]

Pop 18-24.D.L2

-5.6327**
[2.6187]
-8.6763**
[3.8194]
11.1302**
[4.9288]

Pop 65 Plus.D
Gini.D.L1

2318.686
[495.4408]

468.6107*
[143.9617]
-17.5364
[3.9225]

Exports.D
Voting Year
Congressional

0.0050*
[0.0015]

1.8954***
[1.0072]

Pop Asian.D

Pop White.D.L2

-0.0101
[0.0014]

3.0753**
[1.3191]

Table 10 cont. Federal Aid & Transfer Payments to Individuals – Prediction of Independent Variables Using GDP
Independent
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Family

Health

Housing

Incapacity

Labor

Old Age

Unemployment

Other

Voting Year
3.8493*
[1.3579]
Congressional.L3
-1.2779**
Income Shares Top
1.D.L1
[0.6416]
-3.7414
Income Shares Top
10.D.L1
[0.8253]
Note 1: Year fixed effects, if significant, included but not reported.
Note 2: *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Default is significant at 0.1%. The values within “[…]” are standard errors.
Note 3: “of Interest” represents lags of the columns dependent variable.
Note 4: GDP was not significant in predicting Other. Though not duplicated here, the values for Other from Table 11 is utilized for regressions on GDP in
Table 12.
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Table 11. Federal Aid & Transfer Payments to Individuals – Prediction of Independent Variables Using Income/PCE
Independent
Variable
Adjusted R2

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Family

Health

Housing

Incapacity

Labor

Old Age

Unemployment

Other

.6978

0.694

.7344
-0.7681
[0.0319]
-0.5047
[0.0442]
-0.1713
[0.0347]
0.0022
[0.0005]

.4768

.8458
0.2885
[0.0542]

.9686
0.3655
[0.0636]
0.1960
[0.0360]
0.3220
[0.0388]
-0.0006*
[0.0002]

.8496
0.1648
[0.0246]
-0.2503
[0.0532]

.4012

Of Interest.D.L1
Of Interest.D.L2

-0.1287*
[0.0373]

Of Interest.D.L3
Of Interest^2.D.L1
Of Interest^2.D.L2
Of Interest^2.D.L3

-0.4632
[0.0373]
-0.3347
[0.0469]
0.0004**
[0.0001]
-0.0012
[0.0001]
-0.0014
[0.0001]

-0.0016
[0.0004]
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-0.0079
[0.0019]

0.0490
[0.0118]

0.0023***
[0.0012]

0.0056*
[0.0019]

-0.0118
[0.0033]
-0.0064
[0.0018]
0.0126
[0.0034]

PCE.D.L2
0.0031**
[0.0013]

PCE.D.L3

-0.00137**
[0.0006]
-0.0016**
[0.0006]

IpC.D
-0.0200**
[0.0077]

IpC.D.L1
IpC.D.L2

Pop Black.D.L

Pop 17 and
Under.D.L2

-0.0028**
[0.0011]
-0.0040
[0.0011]

-0.0078
[0.0021]
-0.0078*
[0.0024]

0.0057*
[0.0021]

-21.6041
[5.8744]

11.1970**
[5.0498]

2.0139**
[0.9992]

Pop Asian.D.L1

Pop White.D.L2

-0.0009
[0.0002]

-0.0023**
[0.0010]

PCE.D
PCE.D.L1

0.0036
[0.0007]

1.1118*
[0.4001]
20.4275***
[10.9996]

-5.3166**
[2.6078]

Table 11 cont. Federal Aid & Transfer Payments to Individuals – Prediction of Independent Variables Using
Income/PCE
Independent
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Family

Health

Housing

Incapacity

Labor

Old Age

Unemployment

Other

-8.9745**
[3.8076]

Pop 18-24.D.L2

9.1472***
[4.7548]

Pop 65 Plus.D
Gini.D.L1#

1684.087
[460.5132]

527.2988
[148.8831]
-17.8209
[4.0552]

Exports.D
Turnover.L2

-1.8443***
[1.0895]

-7.8499**
[3.7111]
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55.7357
Voting Year
Presidential
[13.0361]
70.0572
Voting Year
Presidential.L3
[12.3261]
4.7037*
Voting Year
Congressional
[1.4136]
5.8572
Voting Year
Congressional.L3
[1.5298]
-3.9734
Income Shares Top
10.D
[0.8669]
#
The difference of the Gini ratio has a value between -0.05 and 0.13. Even with large coefficients, the total effect is within an expected range.
The difference of Spending to GDP represents a ratio with a value between -0.04 and 0.05. Even with large coefficients, the total effect is within an expected range.
Note 1: Year fixed effects, if significant, included but not reported.
Note 2: *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Default is significant at 0.1%. The values within “[…]” are standard errors.
Note 3: “of Interest” represents lags of the columns dependent variable.

Table 12. Federal Aid & Transfer Payments to Individuals – Prediction of GDP per Capita
Independent Variable
Adjusted R2
Housing.D.L3
Labor.D
Old Age.D.L2

(1)
GDPpC

(2)
GDPpC

(3)
GDPpC

0.3585

0.4227

0.3683

(4)
GDPpC
0.37

10.2099*
[3.3176]
-12.3572**
[4.8259]

(5)
GDPpC

(6)
GDPpC

0.4465

0.4809

11.2011**
[4.7942]
-19.7551*
[6.6974]

11.9583**
[4.6450]
-21.1649*
[6.5025]

-5.5661
[3.3761]

-5.8690**
[2.5658]
-19210.65
Gini.D.L1#
[4784.109]
137.7153
Income Shares Top 10.D.L1
[31.3337]
719.1446
Voting Year Congressional
[105.1779]
824.4604
Voting Year Congressional.L3
[162.0569]
#
The difference of the Gini ratio has a value between -0.05 and 0.13. Even with large coefficients, the total effect is within an expected
range.
Note 1: Year fixed effects included, if significant, but not reported.
Note 2: GDP per Capita lags 1 and 2 included, but not reported, for columns 1-7. Only 2nd lag included for column 8.
Note 3: *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Default is significant at 0.1%. The values within “[…]” are standard errors.
Unemployment.D.L3

-2.6334***
[1.3584]

-6.5972**
[2.5735]
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Table 13. Federal Aid & Transfer Payments to Individuals – Prediction of Income per Capita
Independent Variable
Adjusted R2
Family Residuals.D.L1
Housing Residuals.D.L3
Incapacity Residuals.D
Labor Residuals.D.L3
Unemployment
Residuals.D.L2
Other Residuals.D.L1

(1)
IpC

(2)
IpC

(3)
IpC

(4)
IpC

(5)
IpC

(6)
IpC

(7)
IpC

(8)
IpC

0.4605
-2.2303***
[1.2910]

0.5101

0.4345

0.4903

0.486

.4607

0.4985

0.5418

10.2738*
[3.4805]
4.4220**
[2.0359]
-11.4013**
[5.1267]

12.6504
[3.4005]
3.6902***
[1.9548]
-10.9633**
[4.9152]

8.2238
[2.3761]
2.3035***
[1.2175]
-8.0356**
[3.7130]
-2.0717**
[0.9385]
1.7489***
[0.9777]

Pop 17 and Under.D.L2
Pop 18-24.D.L2
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Voting Year Congressional
Income Shares Top 10.D
Note 1: Year fixed effects included, if significant, but not reported.
Note 2: Income per Capita lags 1 and 2 included, but not reported.
Note 3: *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Default is significant at 0.1%. The values within “[…]” are standard errors.

313.4193*
[93.3626]
327.1763**
[156.843]
439.3321
[115.6658]
93.4253
[23.6831]

Table 14. Federal Aid & Transfer Payments to Individuals – Prediction of PCE per Capita
Independent
Variable
Adjusted R2
Health Residuals.D.L3
Labor Residuals.D.L3
Old Age Residuals.D.L1
Unemployment
Residuals.D.L2
Other Residuals.D.L1

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

PCEpC

PCEpC

PCEpC

PCEpC

PCEpC

PCEpC

PCEpC

PCEpC

0.7236

0.7269
-0.3637**
[0.1503]

0.7282

0.7265

0.7275

0.7108

0.7368
-0.3107***
[0.1661]
-6.6031*
[2.2085]

0.759
-0.3309**
[0.1598]
-6.6803*
[2.1146]

-0.9425***
[0.4948]
1.4138*
[0.5224]

-1.0486**
[0.4817]
1.3521*
[0.5012]
200.3102*
[65.2417]
144.1453
[38.0712]
-863.5265
[52.2570]
316.9802
[56.2301]
70.3423
[10.0792]

-5.5054*
[1.9195]
-2.2580***
[1.2006]
-0.8291***
[0.4552]
1.7349*
[0.5145]

Pop Black.D.L
Exports.D
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Voting Year Presidential
Voting Year
Presidential.L3
Income
Shares Top 10.D
Note 1: Year fixed effects included, if significant, but not reported.
Note 2: PCE per Capita lags 1 and 3 included, but not reported, for columns 1-7. Only 1 lag include for column 8.
Note 3: *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Default is significant at 0.1%. The values within “[…]” are standard errors.
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